Transformed for exact flowing-text e-e-book format replica, this NASA accident investigation board report - named after its chairman, Edgar Cortright - supplies distinctive particulars, including a total incident timeline, about the triggers of the Apollo thirteen accident in April 1970. The Apollo thirteen mission, planned as a lunar landing in the Fra Mauro location, was aborted because of an abrupt decline of support module cryogenic oxygen connected with a fire in one particular of the two tanks at approximately fifty six hours. The lunar module supplied the essential assist to maintain a minimum operational problem for a secure return to earth.
The Apollo thirteen Evaluation Board was charged with the responsibilities of examining the conditions surrounding the accident, of creating the possible triggers of the accident, of assessing the usefulness of flight recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of building recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has manufactured each and every energy to have out its assignment in a complete, aim, and neutral manner. In doing so, the Board manufactured powerful use of the failure analyses and corrective motion reports carried out by the Manned Spacecraft Heart and was very amazed with the commitment and objectivity of this energy. It grew to become very clear in the training course of the Board's assessment that the accident for the duration of the Apollo thirteen mission was initiated in the support module cryogenic oxygen tank no. two. The accident is judged to have been practically catastrophic. Only exceptional performance on the component of the crew, Mission Management, and other customers of the team which supported the functions successfully returned the crew to Earth. The initial perseverance of fifty manufactured by the board mentioned:
The trigger of the failure of oxygen tank no. two was combustion within the tank. Evaluation confirmed that the electrical energy flowing into the tank could not account for the noticed boosts in strain and temperature. The heater, temperature sensor, and quantity probe did not initiate the accident sequence. The trigger of the combustion was most almost certainly the ignition of Teflon wire insulation on the admirer motor wires, brought on by electric arcs in this wiring. The protecting thermostatic switches on the heaters in oxygen tank no. two failed closed for the duration of the original portion of the initial special detanking operation. This subjected the wiring in the vicinity of the heaters to very high temperatures which have been subsequently shown to seriously degrade Teflon insulation.